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Definitions  
Accident 
An intended event or sequence events that cause harm, injury, death or damage to the 
environment or asset.  
Availability 
The ability of an item under combined aspects of its reliability, maintainability, and 
maintenance support) to perform its required function at a stated instant of time or over stated 
period of time (BSI-Standards, 2009).  
Blowout 
A blowout is an incident where formation fluid flows out of the well uncontrollably. It is 
usually a result of the breakdown of both well barriers.  
Burn in method 
The process where an item is exercised to weed out all the defective parts and failures from 
manufacturing or poor installation. This is performed before the complete assembly of the 
system. 
Condition based 
maintenance 
(CBM) 
This maintenance entails checking for potential failures so that action can be taken to prevent 
the functional failure or to avoid the consequences of a functional failure (Moubray, 1997). 
Consequence  An outcome of an event (Corneliussen, 2006).  
Corrective 
maintenance  
Actions or tasks carried out to repair or restore an item so „it is as good as new‟ (BSI-
Standards, 2009).  
Deviation  Departure from a norm or design specification.  
Distribution 
function 
Consider a random variable X. The distribution function of X is: 
   (     (     (                       
Downtime The period of time that an item is unable to perform its function.  
Fail Safe device 
One whose failure on its own will become evident to the operating crew under normal 
circumstances (Moubray, 1997). 
Failure The inability of an item to perform its required function (Moubray, 1997). 
Failure effect Describes what happens when a failure mode takes place (Moubray, 1997). 
Failure mode An event which is reasonably likely to cause each failed state (Moubray, 1997).  
Failure rate 
The frequency of failure usually calculated by dividing the number of failures by the total 
lifetime of that item (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Fault 
The ability of an item, under stated conditions of use, to be retained in, or restored to, a state 
in which it can perform its required functions, when maintenance is performed under stated 
conditions and using prescribed procedures and resources (BSI-Standards, 2009).  
Functional Failure  When an item is unable to fulfil a function to the required performance (Moubray, 1997). 
Functions The design intent of the item/system, how well it performs under specific condition.  
Hazard A Potential source of harm (IEC, 1998). 
Hidden failure A failure that can only be detected during testing.  
Hydraulic control 
line 
A small-diameter hydraulic line used to operate downhole completion equipment such as the 
surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SSSV).  In this mode, the control line remains 
pressurized at all times. Any leak or failure results in loss of control line pressure, acting to 
close the safety valve and render the well safe (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Incident  
Any unplanned event resulting in, or having potential for, adverse consequences (ISO8402, 
1994). 
Item  Part of a system, device or equipment that can be studied separately (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Lead Time to 
Failure (LTTF) 
The time from detection of item deterioration to its loss of function (BSI-Standards, 2009). 
Leak testing  
The application of pressure to detect leaks in a well barrier, well barrier element or other 
objects that are designed to confine pressurised fluids or liquids or gas (NORSOK, 2013).  
Maintainability  
Maintenance  
The combinations of all technical and corresponding administrative actions, including 
supervision actions, intended to retain an entity in, or restore it to, a state in which it can 
perform its required function (IEC60050-191, 1990).  
Mean Time before 
Failure (MTBF)  
This average time excludes the time spent waiting for repair, being repaired, being re-
qualified, and other downing events such as inspections and preventive maintenance and so 
on; it is intended to measure only the time a system is available and operating (Reliability-
HotWire, 2008).  
Mean Time to The expected time to failure for a non-repairable system (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004).  
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Mean Time to 
Repair (MTTR)  
The average time needed to repair a failed item.  
P-F interval 
The elapsed time between the detection of a potential failure and the occurrence of a 
functional failure (Moubray, 1997). 
Potential Failure 
An identifiable condition which indicates that a functional failure is either about to occur or in 
the process of occurring (Moubray, 1997). 
Preventive 
maintenance  
The maintenance carried out at predetermined intervals or corresponding to prescribed criteria 
and intended to reduce the probability of failure or performance degradation of an item (BSI-
Standards, 2009).  
Primary well 
barrier  
First object that prevents flow from a source (NORSOK, 2013).  
Production Master 
Valve (PMV) 
A valve located on the Xmas tree that controls all flow from the wellbore. Most Xmas tress 
has two master valves fitted. The upper master valve is used on a routine basis, with the lower 
master valve providing backup or contingency function in the event that the normal service 
valve is leaking and needs replacement (Schlumberger, 2005). This report focuses on the 
upper master valve.  
Production Wing 
Valve (PWV)  
A valve located on the side of the Xmas tree. Two wing valves are generally fitted to the x-
mas tree. A flowing wing valve is used to control and isolate production, and the service (kill) 
wing valve fitted on the opposite side of the Christmas tree is available for treatment or well-
control purposes. The term wing valve typically is used when referring to the flowing wing 
(Schlumberger, 2005). This report focuses on the flowing wing valve.  
Redundancy 
Existence of more than one item with a shared function. These items act as backup should a 
failure occur in one of the items (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Reliability  
The ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environmental and 
operational conditions, and for a stated period of  time (ISO8402, 1994) 
Reliability centred 
maintenance  
An evaluation process which identifies the maintenance requirements and testing needs 
necessary to maintain the operational reliability of the safety valves (Moubray, 1997).  
Risk acceptance 
criteria  
A criterion which is based on a cost benefit analysis that assesses the tolerability to certain 
risks.  
Risk Analysis 
Systematic use of available information to estimate the likelihood and consequences of risks 
and their components (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Safety Integrity  
Probability of a safety system performing the required safety functions under all the stated 
conditions in a given time frame (IEC, 1998).  
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) 
One of four possible discrete levels for specifying a target level of risk reduction. SIL1 has 
the lowest level of safety integrity and SIL 4 has the highest (IEC, 1998).   
Secondary well 
barrier 
Second object which prevents flow from a source (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Subsurface Safety 
Valve 
A downhole safety valve that is operated from surface facilities through a control line 
strapped to the external surface of the production tubing. Two basic types of SCSSV are 
common: wireline retrievable and tubing retrievable. The control system operates in a fail-
safe mode, with hydraulic control pressure used to hold open a ball or flapper assembly that 
will close if the control pressure is lost (Schlumberger, 2005). 
Systematic failure 
Failure related in a deterministic way to a cause, which can only be eliminated by a 
modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, 
documentation, or other factors (IEC, 1998). Systematic failures usually occur due to 
manufacturing defects or incorrect assembly of the item.  
Test frequency The number of tests performed in a unit time interval (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Test interval The elapsed time between the initiation of consecutive tests on that unit (Corneliussen, 2006). 
Well barrier 
element (WBE) 
An object that alone cannot prevent flow from one side to the other side of itself (NORSOK, 
2013). 
Workover 
Preventive or corrective maintenance tasks that require pulling out the Xmas tree and the well 
completion string (Corneliussen, 2006).  
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Abbreviations  
AD Anderson-Darling  
ANOVA Analysis of Variance  
CBM Condition Based Maintenance  
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function 
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Abstract  
The need for continued well safety has increased greatly in recent years and as a result tighter regulations have 
been put in place to ensure safer operations whilst enabling the extraction of the maximum possible value from an 
asset. The recent well integrity guidelines issued by Oil and Gas UK recommend testing the DHSVs (Downhole 
Safety Valves) every six months unless „reliability findings specific to the asset, valve type or location‟ specify a 
different testing frequency. A documented rationale is required to either justify the current lower frequency of 
testing or accept the recommended frequency and incur significant additional deferment. 
Three hydraulically actuated safety valves isolate flow from a producing well entirely from the outside 
surroundings; these are the PWV (Production Wing Valve), PMV (Production Master Valve) and the SSSV 
(Subsurface Safety Valve). These valves are able to completely shut-in the well to prevent uncontrolled flow. Risk 
quantification is the foundation of an effective prevention strategy, and therefore the probability that these valves 
will operate on demand was determined and then quantitatively linked to a testing frequency that will ensure the 
reliability standards are met.   
The data from the integrity test reports were sourced from the eWIMS database, processed, analysed and then 
used in the RBM (Reliability Based Model). The RBM assumed a SIL3 (target level of risk reduction) for an 
offshore platform well and control limits in the range of 99.9% to 99.95% target availability. For each resulting 
testing programme, an economic analysis was then conducted to determine their feasibility.  
The most feasible testing programme was based on a target availability of 99.9% and a lower confidence 
interval of 95%. This decision was influenced by the slow progression rate of the failure and the inaction taken once 
this failure has been detected. The RBM showed that only 25% of the wells studied required testing every 6 months 
and that 57% of the wells needed testing every 9 months or more to remain compliant with the standards. Thus a 
rather blind implementation of the latest OGUK requirements would have led to significant over-testing, 
unnecessary production deferment and maintenance costs.  
1. Introduction  
1.1. Problem Statement  
Oil and Gas UK (OGUK) has recently issued new guidelines for well integrity testing (WIT). These guidelines 
state that downhole safety valves (DHSVs) should be tested at least „every 6 months unless local conditions or 
documented historical data indicate a different testing frequency‟ (OGUK, 2012). Further to this recommendation, 
„the frequency of testing valves should be validated by reliability findings that are specific to the asset and type of 
valve or location‟ (OGUK, 2012). Shell UK tests less frequently than the recommended testing frequency. A 
documented rationale is required to either justify the current lower frequency of testing or accept the recommended 
frequency and incur significant additional deferment.  
1.2. Research Motivation  
Major oil industry incidents such as the Ekofisk Bravo (Norway), Piper Alpha (United Kingdom) and Macondo 
Blowout (Gulf of Mexico) led to an increase in government involvement; where tighter directives have been issued 
to avoid the reoccurrence of such accidents (Visser, 2011). Lord Cullen’s report (1990) highlighted the benefits of 
having goal-setting regulations over prescriptive ones; for this allows continuous improvements in safety whilst also 
providing flexibility in the response to local conditions (Kuo, 2001). The requirement for DHSV (Downhole Safety 
Valve) installation in the UK is an embodiment of the report. Although there is no law enacted to mandate the 
installation of DHSVs, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) require the duty holder to maintain as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP) measures. This is attained through risk assessments, regular inspections and 
maintenance tasks (Corneliussen, Well Safety – Risk Control in the Operational Phase of Offshore Wells , 2006).   
Despite these regulations, there still remains a perceived conflict between production and safety. Risk reduction 
activities such as well integrity testing require the temporary shutdown of production operations which result in 
production deferment and thus cash-flow penalties for the operator. However, the current study demonstrates the 
compatibility between production and safety demands from the quantitative analysis of integrity test data.  
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1.3. Project Objectives  
Well integrity management can benefit from reliability assessments especially in light of the latest OGUK 
safety recommendations. This thesis introduces a novel and practical method for determining the availability and 
hence the testing frequency of the PWV (Production Wing Valve), the PMV (Production Master Valve) and the 
SSSV (Subsurface Safety Valve). The project objectives are as follows:  
 Review the failure history data and capture any underlying trends in the data 
 Assess the suitability of the OGUK recommended practices  
 Predict the availability of the isolation valves as safety critical isolation barriers  
 Determine the most suitable testing procedure for each well  
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Well Integrity Management (WIM):  
Well Integrity is defined as „the application, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled 
release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of the well‟ (NORSOK, 2013). WIM has the aim of delivering 
better and safer wells by addressing each stage and ensuring risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) in 
the well life cycle; thereby extending the lifetime of the well (Fig. 2.1) (Wilson, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. ‎2.1: Flowchart showing the different stages of the 
well lifecycle that WIM focuses on. 
 
 
 
Although prolonging the lifetime of an ageing asset is both possible and profitable due to recent advancements in 
technology, there are many well integrity issues linked with this extension (Corneliussen, Well Safety – Risk 
Control in the Operational Phase of Offshore Wells , 2006). Corrosion, scaling and annulus pressure build-up that 
exceeds the maximum allowable surface pressure are just some of these problems. An effective WIM programme 
prevents such issues and ensures compliance to standards by assessing the risks and establishing a monitoring, 
surveillance and maintenance procedure specific to each asset (Al-Ashhab, 2004).  
2.2. Functions and Performance Standards  
There are regulatory bodies present worldwide to ensure performance standards are 
met; such bodies include NORSOK D-010, for Norway, and OGUK, for the UK. Both 
the NORSOK D-010 and OGUK standards state that ‘at least two independent and 
tested barriers’ shall be put in place to prevent hydrocarbon leakage (NORSOK, 2013). 
They also stress that planning for ‘installation, removal, testing and monitoring of 
barriers during all operations’ is key for managing well integrity (OGUK, 2012).  
The accepted industry definition of a well barrier is ‘an envelope of one or several 
independent barrier elements preventing fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally 
from the formation into another formation or to surface’ (NORSOK, 2013). 
Corneliussen describes a well barrier as a ‘pressurised vessel (an envelope) that is 
capable of containing the reservoir fluids’; so that a well with a dual barrier can be 
viewed as a system of ‘two pressurised vessels’ (Corneliussen, 2006). This redundant 
system ensures high system availability as a single failure of a barrier element cannot 
lead to a blowout. For example, a damaged secondary barrier element such as wellhead 
will activate the primary barrier thus controlling the well and preventing uncontrolled 
flow (Corneliussen, 2006). Barrier elements can be either active (e.g. valves that need 
to be activated to work such as SSSV) or passive (e.g. fixed structures such as cement 
or casing) (King & King, 2013).  A well barrier failure occurs when one of the barrier 
elements fails (Table 2.1); this failure does not necessarily mean that the well will leak 
reservoir fluid. For a leak path to form a sufficient driving force is required, following 
the breakdown of a barrier. The failure of both barriers in sequence results in a well 
integrity failure. This is the worst-case scenario, as it typically results in reservoir fluid 
leakage to rock strata, aquifers, soils and the atmosphere (Davies, 2014).  
 
 
Fig.2.2: Offshore platform 
well schematic for natural 
flow showing the six primary 
barrier elements (blue) and 
the six secondary barrier 
elements (red). 
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Fig.2.2: Fail-safe actuator which is 
held open by hydraulic pressure 
supplied from the hydraulic system 
(p.441) (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). 
Table ‎2.1: The well barrier elements for a well on an offshore platform with natural flow (Torbergsen et al., 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Well Control  
The emergency shutdown system consists of the PWV, PMV and SSSV isolation valves. Each of these three valves 
has the ability to stop flow and completely shut-in the well independently of each other. During production, these 
valves lie dormant in an open position to allow the flow of fluid to the surface, but in case of an emergency these 
safety valves can be activated on demand. The open/close state of the valve is determined by the amount of pressure 
that is supplied through a control line, from the surface of the platform to the valve. This control line is pressurised 
at all times to balance a spring force and keep the valve open during operation (Garner, 2002). These safety valves 
operate on a fail-safe mode so that a control line pressure loss only occurs in case of a failure (e.g. a leak). When the 
control line pressure is bled off, the spring force causes the valve to close and hence results in the shut-in of the well 
(Lindqvist et al., 1988). 
For the successful operation of the safety valve the ‘control line, control fluid and the surface control systems’ must 
be installed correctly and maintained appropriately (Garner, 2002). The monitoring and adequate maintenance of 
these elements has been eased by the development of remotely controlled safety valves whose activation does not 
depend on changes in downhole conditions.  
XT Valves (Christmas tree Valves) 
A Christmas tree is an assembly of valves, fittings and spools and its main purposes are to allow flow control via the 
PMV or the PWV, and to provide a vertical entry path into the wellbore for wireline tools and maintenance. In cases 
of an emergency, failure or leakage, these valves are closed by bleeding off the pressure in the hydraulic control 
line. If this is not possible then the valve actuator’s hydraulic system can be drained from other areas. The XT valves 
are the main isolation devices, whereas the SSSV is a back-up and should only be used as a last resort.   
 
SSSV (Subsurface Safety Valves) 
There are two different types of SSSVs: WRSVs (Wireline Retrievable Valves) and TRSVs (non-retrievable valves, 
also known as Tubing Retrievable Valves), but TRSVs are the most common used as they do not reduce the tubing 
diameter and are also deemed ‘more reliable’ (Rausand & Vatn, 1998). However, if a TRSV fails, it would require a 
rig to pull the entire tubing for its replacement which would be costly. There are also two different shut off 
mechanisms: a flapper or a ball. A flapper acts like a door and is known to respond quicker, making them more 
favourable (Garner, 2002). This study was carried out on TRSVs with flapper closure.  
2.4. Well Integrity Testing  
Although completions are designed to minimise the likelihood of corrosion 
and erosion, the variable conditions during production can still result in well 
integrity issues (Garner, 2002). Equipment parts that have failure modes, 
which are susceptible to age-related faults such as fatigue and corrosion 
account for 11% of machine components (Nowlan & Heap, 1978). The safety 
valves under consideration exhibit age-related failures as over time, their 
performance is expected to deteriorate and the probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) is expected to increase. This stresses the need for a well-
administered maintenance strategy to preserve the main function of the safety 
valves and aid in the early detection of these failure (Kairon, 2008). As 
outlined in Section 2.3, these safety-critical isolation valves are in an open 
position in a production well. Well Integrity tests (WITs) require the 
temporary shut-in of the well and entail routinely cycling the valves by 
bleeding and then pressurising the control line (Kairon, 2008). 
Primary Barrier Secondary Barrier 
Cap rock above reservoir Formation above production packer 
Casing Casing with seal assembly 
Cement casing Wellhead 
Production packer Tubing hanger with seals 
Subsurface Safety Valve (SSSV) A-annulus outlet valves 
Completion string between Packer and SSSV Christmas tree valves (XT valves) 
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On demand, the logic solver sends an electric signal to the solenoid valve causing it to open which causes a loss in 
hydraulic pressure and hence, the closure of the valve (Fig 2.2). Measurements such as the time to closure and the 
pressure build up are recorded. At the end of the test, the valve is opened again to allow production by applying 
hydraulic pressure to the control line (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). The safety function for the isolation of a topside 
well is illustrated in Appendix A.  
Essentially, the aim of testing is to gauge how effective the safety valves will be in an emergency. For a valve to 
„pass‟ a WIT, the closure time should not exceed 30s and the leak rates should be less than or equal to 400cc/min for 
oil wells and 15scf/min for gas wells (API-RP-14B, 2004). The leak rates are determined by measuring the pressure 
differentials adjacent to the valve and in the cavities bordering these valves (OGUK, 2012). If a valve was to exceed 
the allowable leak rate, then a programme for repair and corrective maintenance is put in place. Repair tasks carry 
risks to the personnel and so it has become practice to carry out further retests before a „failed valve‟ is recorded on 
the system.  
 
2.5. Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)  
RCM (Reliability centred maintenance) is an efficient evaluation process which is driven by safety and then 
economics. It identifies the maintenance requirements and testing needs necessary to maintain the operational 
reliability of the safety valves (Moubray, 1997). RCM entails performing a functional failure modes, effects and 
criticality analysis (FMECA) and then identifying when a preventive maintenance task is economically preferable to 
a merely corrective one (i.e. perform maintenance only at the occurrence of a failure) (IAEA, 2007).  
 
 
Fig.‎2.3: RCM structure that shows the types of maintenance that can be carried out. 
CBM (Condition Based Maintenance) is one of four general maintenance strategies and is based on the premise of 
carrying out regular inspections (e.g. Well Integrity tests) to detect potential failures and take corrective action 
before a functional failure can take place. The inspection frequency should be at least twice the P-F interval (see 
section 2.9) to ensure that the failure mode can be adequately identified (BSI-Standards, 2009). Although the main 
objective of any CBM programme is to minimise the total cost of inspections and 
repair, care must be taken to ensure that correct testing is applied to identify the failure 
modes in question. Some engineers believe that periodic overhauls can impose certain 
stresses that damage the components, especially if they are non-age related failures 
(Rausand & Vatn, 1998).  
Nowlan and Heap showed that whilst three out of the six probability failure functions 
are age-related, two out of the three of the non-age related failure curves suffer from 
infant mortality (Nowlan & Heap, 1978). The shape of failure curves A, B, E and F 
(Fig 2.4) are governed by the Weibull shape parameter denoted by β. Beta Values 
lower than one are characteristic of early time failures, which are caused by the 
installation of „dead-on-arrival‟ products that result in high initial failure rates. This 
region can be assumed negligible as all the safety valves that are installed must have 
passed the CSU (commissioning and start-up) testing and have had a few burn-in 
procedures performed on them to weed out all the defective parts. Therefore, in this 
study, the wear-out failure curve (curve B in Fig. 2.4) can be safely assumed. Curve B, 
displays a prolonged constant failure zone. Extension of the valve life can be achieved 
through an effective CBM programme. However, over time as wear and age take their 
toll on the safety valves, the failure rate is expected to increase. At this late stage, 
reliability assessments become crucial when deciding for a repair.  
Fig.2.4: The six dominant curves 
where the probability of failure is 
represented as a function of time 
(Nowlan, 1978). 
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2.6. Causes of failure 
Failures are typically caused by corrosion (due to high H2S content) or erosion (due to a high sand or debris content 
in the reservoir fluid). Severe changes in operating conditions such as excessive pressures or temperatures can also 
cause damage to the valves (Corneliussen, 2006). The PFD of the valve is also believed to increase as a result of 
improper valve operation (Rausand & Vatn, 1998). An example of this is when the PMV is used instead of a choke 
valve to limit flow of production fluid which in turn would lead to abrasion and a „leaking PMV‟ (King, 2013). 
WITs improve the overall reliability of the safety system by cycling and greasing the valves as well as revealing 
„hidden failures‟ which will require corrective maintenance (Corneliussen, 2006).  
2.7. Valve restoration and Repairs 
If a dangerous failure is detected in a SSSV, this can be restored by performing a workover intervention to pull the 
tubing out in order to either carry out remedial tasks or to replace it with a new valve. If the failure identified is due 
to scale building up then the valve can be repaired by flushing the well with chemicals or even fresh water to clean it 
(Corneliussen, 2006). The time following the detection of a failure is important if the progression rate of the failure 
is fast. However, the time which affects the speed and efficiency at which these repairs are performed depend on 
(Ihe, 2012): 
 Type of well – A workover on a platform well will take less time than one which is carried out for a subsea well 
 Inadequate or incoherent planning of jobs  
 Access constraints 
 Unavailability of service personnel  
 Unavailability of spares for the repair 
2.8. Deviation  
A failure that is not repaired in time is an unacceptable deviation from the design specifications. In order to resume 
production after the identification of a failure, a deviation must be granted. This is achieved by carrying out a risk 
assessment and confirming that the risk is still within acceptable limits, given the current conditions of the well or 
the reservoir. An example of an accepted deviation is when the leak rate does not exceed the limit set by the 
standards (NORSOK, 2013).  
 
2.9. Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)  
The RCM process requires a detailed FMECA to be performed to identify any functional failures and understand the 
mechanisms behind the failure and their consequences. A functional failure is defined as „the inability of any asset to 
fulfil a function to a standard of performance which is acceptable to the user‟ (Moubray, 1997). The isolation valves 
under consideration have a number of possible failure modes, with a failure mode being „one of the possible states 
of a faulty item‟ (See Table 2.2) (Corneliussen, 2006).  
 
 According to the IEC61508/61511 standards there are two types of failure (IEC, 1998):    
 
 Safe Failure (SF) – This is the failure of an item which will increase the likelihood of the safety system 
performing its function.  
 Dangerous Failure (DF) – This is the failure of an item which will reduce the likelihood of the safety system 
performing its function. This type of failure will put the safety instrumented system into a hazardous state. 
The severity of a failure is determined by the consequences of that failure on human life and the damage of that 
failure to the system and environment.  Hammer (1972) ranked failure severity in the following categories (Rausand 
& Hoyland, 2004, p.94):  
 
 Minor: A failure which does not degrade the overall performance of the system beyond the acceptable limits.  
 Major: A failure which degrades the overall performance of the system beyond the acceptable limits.    
 Critical: A failure which degrades the overall performance of the system beyond the acceptable limits and 
creates a safety hazard (i.e. cause death or injury if correction action is not taken).  
 Catastrophic: A failure which can result in many deaths or injuries or prevent performance of the intended 
mission. 
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Table ‎2.2: FMECA on the isolation valves 
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Valves 
shall 
close 
on 
demand 
and 
stop 
flow 
 
Closure time 
of 30s 
Valve 
in open 
position 
Fail to 
Close 
(FTC) 
Damaged valve 
due to: 
- Corrosion 
- Erosion 
- Improper 
operation 
- Plugged control 
line 
DF 
 
Redundan
cy of other 
isolation 
valves 
results in 
increased 
severity 
Catastrophic 
Periodic 
tests 
 
Leak rate less 
than or equal: 
- 400cc/min 
for oil wells 
-15scf/min for 
gas wells 
Leakage in 
a closed 
position 
(LCP)* 
Damaged seal due 
to: 
- Wireline work 
- Corrosion 
- Erosion 
- Improper 
Operation 
Critical 
 
Premature 
Closure 
(PC)** 
Loss of hydraulic 
pressure due to: 
- Leaking seal 
- Ruptured control 
line 
SF 
 
Minor 
(loss in 
production) 
Monitoring 
of 
hydraulic 
pressure 
 
Fail to 
Open 
(FTO) 
Damaged valve or 
leakage in control 
line 
   
* Upon valve closure, differential pressure is created across valve. Pressure increase in tubing is converted into 
leak rates which must not exceed the standards. 
** This type of failure is detected immediately by reduced production output or by the loud sounds from hydraulic 
pumps 
 
 
 Any of the above classified failures can take place at any time 
between consecutive WITs. However, during testing, the dormant 
valves are actuated to confirm that they are still operative and 
reliable. Frequent WITs will lead to the early detection of a 
potential failure, giving more time to take corrective action 
before an actual functional failure can take place.  
 The P-F interval (Fig. 2.5) is the time between identifying the 
potential failure (e.g. a small leak rate) and the point where the 
actual failure takes place (e.g. leak rates that exceed limits) 
(Moubray, 1997). If the testing interval is bigger than the P-F 
interval, then the failure will not be detected in time. Therefore, 
the P-F interval can indicate how often WITs must be performed. 
Although the testing frequency should be at least twice the P-F 
interval, a more accurate testing interval will need to be 
determined (BSI-Standards, 2009). The optimal testing interval 
will be calculated individually for each functional block and each 
class parameter (i.e. all the PMVs of the same class will have the 
same functional failure mode and the same failure rates) (Nowlan 
& Heap, 1978). 
Fig. ‎2.5: The P-F curve showing minimum acceptable 
valve condition is observed at a functional failure 
 
 
 
S: Start of degradation 
P: Potential failure - when a failing item can 
be detected 
F: Functional failure - when an item has failed 
and is unusable 
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On the contrary, some operators advocate the benefits of infrequent testing, as they believe frequent testing causes 
damage to the valve and may even result in hydrate formation (Rausand & Vatn, 1998). This is certainly the case 
when performing slam-shut tests where excessive forces are imposed on the flapper during these tests. Destructive 
tests such as slam-shut tests are usually avoided and are only performed on sticking seals that require high forces to 
operate them.  
3. Methodology  
3.1. SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 
There is a certain reluctance that exists on behalf of the operator to perform frequent WITs due to the temporary 
shutdown of production, thus resulting in production deferment and cash-flow penalties for the operator. WITS also 
pose a risk to the safety of personnel which further adds to the aversion of WITs.  
For this reason, the IEC 61508/61511 have adopted the SIL (Safety Integrity Level) concept in order to specify a 
minimum target level of risk reduction for any SIS (Safety Instrumented System). SIL is defined as the probability 
that a system will perform its function satisfactorily, under certain conditions in a given time frame (IEC, 1998). SIL 
ratings have been linked to the probability of failure on demand (PFD) which is the average time the well can be 
incapable of stopping flow. PFD values have been assigned to two different systems:   
 
 Systems operating continuously have been classed under “high demand mode of operation” 
 Systems operating when demanded have been classed under “low demand mode of operation” 
 
The IEC 61508 standard has defined a risk acceptance criterion for the each of the two systems (IEC, 1998). This 
criteria is based on a cost benefit analysis which assesses the tolerability to certain risks. Factors such as the 
consequences of that risk and its associated frequency have the greatest influence on the acceptability of that risk 
(Table 3.1). 
Table ‎3.1: Risk acceptance criteria 
 
Consequences Oil volume released to the sea (m
3
) Acceptable frequency/yr 
CA: Minor harm <10 10
-1
 
CB: Moderate harm 10-100 10
-2
 
CC: Major harm 100-1000 10
-3
 
CD: Critical harm 1000-10000 10
-4
 
CE: Catastrophic harm >10000 10
-5
  
 
A risk reduction graph (Fig 3.1) has also been provided by the standards. This graph accounts for the demand rate 
(i.e. the W parameter) of the safety system under consideration as well as the associated consequences of that risk. 
The demand rate estimates the frequency of a hazardous event occurring in the absence of the SIS (Hauge, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The occurrence of a platform well containment failure is rare (W1) but it will result in critical harm (CD) for the 
personnel on the platform. It will also result in harm to the environment as substantial volume of oil will be released 
(1000-10000m
3
) if it were to occur (Table 3.1). Consequently Fig. 3.1 shows that a minimum SIL3 is required to 
ensure risk remains within the acceptable range on platform wells. In an attempt to quantify risks, the IEC standards 
have linked SIL requirements with PFD values (Table 3.2) (IEC, 1998).   
Fig.3.1: Risk Reduction graph to 
determine that the safety system in 
a platform well has a SIL3 rating.  
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Table ‎3.2: For a low demand mode of operation, an average probability of failure on demand has been assigned to each SIL. 
 
 SIL requirements can then be related to the availability of the safety system by:  
                   Eq.‎3.1. 
 
This means that in order to comply with the standards and meet the SIL3 rating, 99.9-99.99% availability of the SIS 
must be achieved at all times. 
3.2. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) 
Reliability is defined as the probability that an item will perform its intended function under specific conditions for a 
given time duration (ISO8402, 1994). Increasing an item‟s reliability is an integral part of risk management systems. 
Reliability can be quantified by determining the failure rate (i.e. the frequency with which an item fails) or the mean 
time before the failure of an item (Appendix C.1.). Availability is defined as the percentage of time that a system is 
in an operable state (Rausand, 2004). 
 
             
       
               
 
 
Eq.3.2. 
It stands to reason that a higher availability results when equipment downtime is reduced. Higher availability is 
achieved with an efficient testing management strategy (Eq.3.2). An additional system design attribute which can 
result in field life extension is maintainability. This is the probability that the item is returned to its operable 
condition in a given time frame under specific conditions using predefined procedures and resources. (Sutton, 2010) 
The RAM requirements can be linked by quantitatively by determining the MTBF (Mean Time before Failure), 
MTTF (Mean Time to Failure) and the MTTR (Mean Time to Repair) (Appendix C.1.). 
3.3. eWIMS (Well Integrity Management System)  
The data in this study was exported from eWIMS, a database which „stores and presents all relevant information 
necessary for well integrity management‟ (Corneliussen & et al, 2007). The information found on eWIMS includes; 
well information, well integrity status, valve status, annuli status, failure history and so on. The dataset which will be 
used in this study came from both the overall integrity test report and the well failure history report for 28 oil 
producing offshore platform wells.  
 
3.4. Data Flow in the RBM (Reliability Based Model)  
The RBM (Reliability Based Model) has been developed as a decision making tool that determines the most suitable 
testing procedure using the extensive well failure history data obtained from eWIMS. RBM was made up of three 
worksheets; the exported integrity test report, the calculations sheet and the results summary sheet.   
 
Fig. ‎3.2: Summary of WIT results after filtering on the test code and test result.  
 
Given that only a few failures were observed, it was necessary to use all the data supplied from the integrity test 
report which included right-censored observations (i.e. valves that have not yet failed). Initially, this dataset went 
through a screening process where the data was filtered on the test code (PMV, PWV and the PSSV) and then the 
test result (Pass or Fail).  This was then summarised as shown in Fig.3.2. The test period was calculated by finding 
the difference between the recent and previous test date. This testing interval was found to be irregular, connoting 
the need for determining an optimal testing programme.  The number of retests carried out on each valve was also 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Average probability of failure to perform its design function on demand 
1               
2               
3               
4               
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recorded in columns F, I and L. If three attempts or more were performed, a failure was recorded in the failure count 
column, regardless of the actual test result (Fig. 3.2). 
The data was then analysed to determine the most representative probability distribution of the dataset. This 
involved carrying out an analysis of variance (ANOVA) (see Appendix B.1) and a variety of statistical fittings. The 
selected distribution was then applied in the RBM to generate an optimal testing programme for the wells studied 
(see Fig. 3.3). 
 
Fig. ‎3.3: Data sourced from eWIMS is processed, analysed and then inputted into the RBM.  
3.5. Development of the RBM 
The RBM was built for a redundant safety system with a SIL3 rating (i.e. PFD=10
-3
-10
-4
). This means that the target 
availability of the safety system must be 99.9% or above at all times which is equivalent to system unavailability of 
9 hours per calendar year. The RBM for the wells studied assumed an exponential distribution with a caveat as it 
used the chi-square function to specify confidence intervals for the results obtained (Appendix D.1).  
 
 
 
Fig. ‎3.4 Flowchart showing the calculations undertaken to determine the overall system availability 
4.  Results  
4.1.  Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 The different operating conditions that exist in each well (fluid type, pressure and 
temperature) will have an impact on the safety valves‟ performance.  Therefore, to be 
able to represent the failure behaviour using only one failure curve it was necessary to 
confirm that the differences in performance was due to random variability (Wilkins, 
2002).  
The ANOVA method was used to assess this and determine whether the MTBF values for the three valve types were 
statistically different. The test statistic was determined by finding the ratio of systematic variation to random 
variation (see Appendix B.1). The results in Table 4.1 indicate that this was not the case as the test statistic was 
found to be smaller than the critical F-value; indicating that the three data groups originate from the same 
population. Thus, confirming that the variability in performance was due to random failures and not systematic 
failures (e.g. manufacturing defects) and therefore, the population of the valves can be represented using one failure 
curve. These findings can further be used to justify amalgamating the data groups if the dataset size is too small for 
the reliability analysis.    
Table ‎4.1 ANOVA results 
α 0.05 
Ftest 0.08 
Fcritical 2.65 
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A box and whiskers plot also confirmed the similarities between the means (Fig 4.1). This plot also showed that the 
lifetime distribution for each valve had a positive skew as the mean values were greater than the median values. This 
inferred that the failure behaviour may be consistent with skewed probability distributions such as the Exponential 
distribution.  
4.2. Probability Distribution Identification  
Using the Minitab software, a more detailed probability distribution diagnostic assessment was performed as 
assuming an unsuitable distribution can lead to wrong results and decisions being made. The box and whiskers plots 
(Fig 4.1) showed that the data is not symmetrically distributed around the mean and so assuming a Normal 
distribution cannot be justified. This was confirmed by carrying out GOF (Goodness of Fit) tests for the Normal, 
Exponential, Weibull and Gamma distributions (Fig 4.2).  
The Anderson-Darling (AD) values and the P-values were determined to quantitatively evaluate the GOF of the 
probability distributions to the real data. Small AD values and P-values higher than the significance level indicate a 
good fit to the dataset. As expected, for the normal distribution the null hypothesis that the data will fit the 
distribution was rejected as it exhibited a high AD statistic of 14 and a P-value that was much less than 0.05. The 
null hypothesis for the other three distributions was accepted. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. ‎4.1. Box and whiskers plot for the PWV, PMV and PSSV showing similarity in the lifetime means and 
the right-skewedness of the data 
 
 
Fig. ‎4.2. Goodness of fit tests showed that the Exponential, Weibull and Gamma distributions provided a good fit to the data 
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The lifetime data for the three valves was combined for the GOF tests. The 
scale parameter of a distribution is equivalent to the characteristic life of the 
valves. Both the Weibull and Gamma distributions gave similar mean lifetime 
values for the valves; but the Exponential distribution predicted a higher mean 
lifetime value (Table 4.2). The shape parameter estimates for both the Weibull 
and the Gamma distribution were also found to be similar and approximately 
the value of one. This is a special case which reduces the two distributions to 
an Exponential distribution (Virtual-Laboratories, 2014).  
4.3.  Estimation of the Weibull Parameters 
To ensure the validity of the exponential assumption, the specific shape 
parameters for each valve were determined. The results shown in Fig. 4.3 
below were generated by using the median ranks method which also 
accommodated for right-censored data (Appendix D.5) (Dodson, 2006). Table 
4.3 shows that the Weibull shape parameters for the three valves can be 
approximated to unity, suggesting constant failure rate behaviour which can be represented by the exponential 
distribution.  This distributional assumption becomes invalid when a constant failure rate cannot be justified.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
It is also important to note that due to the small dataset available per well, the Weibull distribution could not have 
been implemented. This is because the median ranks method used to determine the Weibull parameters required a 
larger dataset size (>50 results) (Dodson, 2006). 
4.4. Multiple Test Attempts  
Reviewing the integrity test report showed that some valves 
required a few retests before a successful test was recorded. 
The first attempt usually tests the valve condition as found. 
This was sometimes followed by further attempts where the 
valve was first cycled and the sealing area was then greased 
prior to conducting the WIT. Retests can either indicate 
performance deterioration or flaws in the way the WITs were 
carried out. As the system is safety-critical any tests that 
were conducted more than three times were regarded as a 
failure irrespective of the final test result (Figure 4.4). The 
fact that the weakest links in all the wells studied were the 
PMVs can confirm deficiency in the way these WITs were 
carried out, especially for pre-2010 records. This observation 
accounted for approximately 10% of the dataset.  
 
4.5. Quantifying Reliability   
An Exponential distribution assumption implies a constant 
failure rate and independent of time and thus, the failure rate 
is simply the reciprocal of MTBF. Uncertainty in the estimation of these parameters was managed by defining a 
confidence interval that gave the most likely MTBF range from the dataset (Appendix D.4). 
Table ‎4.2 Goodness of fit test results 
Distribution Shape, β Scale, η 
Normal - 1295 
Exponential - 1812 
Weibull 1.06 1453 
Gamma 0.98 1473 
Table ‎4.3 Weibull Parameters 
 
 Shape, β Scale, η 
PWV 1.04 2525 
PMV 1.38 1037 
PSSV 1.14 1799 
Fig.4.3 Estimation of the Weibull Parameters using the median ranks method 
Figure 4.4 Test success for FWV (production wing 
valve), production master valve (UMGV) and the 
subsurface safety valve (SSSV). 
FWV UMGV SSSV
Fail 1.4% 3.7% 3.8%
>3 0.4% 4.7% 0.3%
3 0.0% 7.1% 0.3%
2 0.4% 5.8% 3.4%
1 97.9% 78.6% 92.1%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Test success by number of attempts and failures 
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All the valves showed a slow progression rate of failure as the lowest reported MTBF value was approximately 20 
months (Fig 4.5). The PMV was found to be the weakest link in the majority of the wells studied as they had the 
lowest MTBF values on average. An explanation for this can be the reported misuse of some of the PMVs as they 
were used to limit flow instead of the choke valves, causing premature wear.  The PWVs were found to be the most 
reliable as the least number of failures and the highest MTBF scores were observed (Fig. 4.6). It follows that a 
higher MTBF is always sought as it connotes high valve availability.  
 
4.6. RBM  
The overall system availability described the three safety valves performing their intended function on demand. Due 
to the criticality and severity of the failure modes, the RBM used the results with a lower 95% confidence interval 
on MTBF to determine the optimal testing procedure per well (Fig. 4.7).  
The final testing programme was based on achieving a target availability of 99.9%. This decision was influenced by 
the efficiency of taking the required repairs once a failure has been detected and by the economic analysis 
conducted.  The RBM also predicted the number of successful WITs needed to increase the testing interval in the 
future (Column G in Fig. 4.7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
The general consensus in this industry is that PM (preventive maintenance) is a 
necessary task that can be both difficult and costly.  Given the business constraints 
and increasing pressure to achieve high equipment availability, optimal PM 
frequencies need to be determined to conform to performance standards whilst 
reducing production deferment and total costs. Scheduling PM tasks at regular 
intervals irrespective of the well failure history may result in over-testing and 
unnecessary maintenance. This was found to be the case if the OGUK requirements 
of testing every 6 months had been implemented.  
46% 
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Fig.4.6 Pie chart showing the percentage of 
failures observed for the three valves.  
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Fig. 4.7 Screenshot of the optimal testing programme from the RBM results summary 
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Fig.5.1 Failure Modes 
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Bloch and Geitner (1983) found that CBM is driven by the fact that 99% of the age-related failures observed are 
usually preceded by signs or warnings that a failure will take place. The relative behaviour of the three isolation 
valves was therefore studied and the Weibull parameters were determined; in order to evaluate how the age of these 
valves has influenced the corresponding failure rates.  The average shape parameter of 1.2 indicated that the valves 
are in the „useful life period‟ of the wear-out failure curve and so the failures observed can be regarded as random. 
The review of the failure data showed that the most common failure modes were in the DU (Dangerous Undetected) 
failure categories: FTC and LCP. The former is a valve that fails to close on command and is normally a result of 
sand or debris that is present in the valve cavity causing high friction between the gate and the sealing seat. The 
latter is a leaking valve in a closed position, and is usually a result of erosion of the gate or the sealing seat of the 
valves. These DU failures are only revealed when the valves were operated through testing; therefore, stressing the 
need for carrying out frequent WITs. 
Some of the wells in this study experienced an increase in sand production due to increased drawdown and an 
increased water cut. The high levels of sand and debris that were suspended in the reservoir fluid accumulated on the 
internal parts of the valves, reducing their performance efficiency. Another explanation of the failure modes in Fig. 
5.1 can be the reported misuse of the XT valves (especially the PMV) to control the production of flowing fluid. 
This produced fluid (which contained sand) crossed the sealing surface of the valves which would have eroded the 
internal mechanisms of the valves (Rausand, 2014).  
The most cost effective type of maintenance for valves operating in the „useful life period‟ of the wear out failure 
curve was proved to be PM (e.g. well integrity tests) (Mann, Saxena, & Knapp, 1995). This is logical as cycling the 
valves and greasing their internal mechanisms can remove the sand grains and debris and thus restore the full valves 
functionality.  
The ANOVA results confirmed that the failure behaviour of the three valves could be presented as the failure 
behaviour of one population. Both visual inspections of the box and whiskers plot and further statistical analysis of 
the means and medians showed that the lifetime data was not consistent with a normal distribution. This was 
expected as it is practice at Shell UK to move forward the date of the next WIT at the identification of a failure; so 
that shorter testing intervals are always attributed to a failure causing the data to be right skewed.  
 
The gamma, Weibull and exponential distribution provided a good fit to the dataset however, as the shape 
parameters were found to be near unity, the gamma and Weibull inevitably reduce to the exponential distribution 
(Fig 4.3). For this constant failure, the chi-square function was used to calculate a confidence interval as an indicator 
for the precision of the dataset. A sensitivity analysis was carried out on the confidence intervals (CI) used in the 
RBM. Varying the lower CI on MTBF from 85% to 95% gave different frequencies of testing (Fig. 5.2). Due to the 
criticality of the safety system, a conservative approach was taken throughout RBM which was based on the 95% 
CI. The RBM functioned by initially defining a control limit of the model (e.g. target availability). Different models 
were run where the control limit was varied from 99.9% target availability to 99.95%.  The RBM then evaluated the 
data and picked up the testing frequency for the three valves that corresponded to the pre-defined target availability. 
Aiming for a target availability of 99.95% (mid SIL3) will aid 
in the early detection of a critical deterioration in performance. 
This will lead to a large P-F interval that will allow enough 
time to take corrective action before a functional failure can 
take place. For well A6 (Fig. 5.2), testing every 6 months will 
ensure 99.9% availability but testing every 3 months will 
achieve a target availability of 99.95%. Although, the cost of 
PM is appreciably less than the cost of a repair, there are many 
drawbacks for targeting the mid-SIL3 range.  
Firstly, reviewing the repair profiles of the failed items showed 
that 50% of the failures identified were not repaired in the time 
frame specified due to access constraints and the unavailability 
of personnel. This means that aiming for a target availability of 
99.95% will lead to unnecessary over-testing and costs due to 
the inaction that is taken once a failure has been detected.  
To add to this, the pre-tax economic model conducted showed 
that aiming for a mid-SIL3 rating would lead to a 48% increase 
in production deferment. As all the wells in this study are 
prolific oil producers, aiming for above average risk reduction 
target will lead to significant losses in production and revenue. 
Therefore, the testing programme was directed to achieve a target availability of 99.9%. 
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Given the large P-F interval determined for each well (e.g. lowest MTBF value was around 20 months) and the slow 
progression rate of the failure, a control limit higher than 99.9% would lead to unnecessary excessive costs.   This 
control limit presented a more economically favourable programme that ensured compliance to the standards and 
allowed enough time to take corrective action. Fig.5.3 highlights the benefits of carrying out the reliability 
assessment using the RBM as only 25% of the wells studied need a 
testing frequency of 6 months. This means the implementation of the 
OGUK requirements would have led to excessive testing and maintenance 
costs. 16 wells out of the 28 reviewed required a testing interval of 9 
months or bigger.  
This analysis also showed that five wells are deemed unreliable and will 
require WITs to be taken every 3 months. This high testing frequency was 
due to evidence of deterioration in performance due to historically high 
failure rates. It can also be a result of operator error. This will need to be 
justified by carrying out a root cause analysis which will identify the root 
causes of this failure and then find evidence to eliminate the unlikely 
causes. If the frequent failures were related to operator error then it is vital 
to ensure that future data is of a better quality. In this instance, the new 
data should be dealt with as a case by case analysis to capture any 
underlying patterns, problems and developments.  
It is important to recognise the limitations of this work. Firstly, the assumption of an exponential distribution is only 
valid if there is a constant failure rate (i.e. shape parameter equal to 1). However, over time, as the valves wear out, 
more age-related failures will be observed and so the shape parameter will increase. In that case, the assumption of a 
constant failure rate can considerably underestimate the failure rate of the valves in the wear-out zone of the failure 
curve; showing inadequacy of the exponential distribution to model the late stages of failure behaviour (Reliability-
Edge, 2001). The accuracy of the RBM can be achieved by updating the model with the latest integrity test reports 
and determining the Weibull shape parameters each time which will reveal the position of the valves in relation to 
the failure curve. According to Murphy et al. redundant systems with many subcomponents cannot be exponentially 
distributed. (Murphy, Carter, & Brown, 2002) However, as the redundant system only contains three components, 
the errors are not significant and an exponential distribution can be accurately assumed.  
6. Conclusions 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this study are given below:  
1. An ANOVA statistical analysis demonstrated that differences between the performances of the valves were a 
result of random variability and not systematic variability. This confirmed that the failure behaviour was better 
represented by a wear-out failure curve.   
2. An exponential distribution was applied in the RBM as opposed to the Weibull or Gamma distributions. This 
was because the shape parameters were found to be near 1. The RBM also performs reliability assessments per 
well which means that the Weibull parameters cannot be estimated for each well due to insufficient data 
available per well.  
3. The most common failure mode in a WIT was found to be a leaking valve in a closed position and the weakest 
link in the safety system was found to be the PMV. The PMVs experienced the highest failures due to the 
increase in sand production and the reported misuse of the PMVs to limit the flow instead of the choke valve; 
causing premature wear. 
4. Reviewing the repair profile of the failed items showed that 50% of the failures identified were not fixed in 
time. It is strongly recommended that the malfunctioning isolation valves need to be replaced in a timely 
fashion as they are safety-critical barriers.  
5. This inaction to complete repairs on time, means that a mid-SIL3 rating would result in the detection of the 
same failures; leading to unnecessary costs.  
6. A blind implementation of the latest OGUK requirements would have led to significant over-testing, 
unnecessary production deferment and maintenance costs as only 25% of the wells studied required a testing 
frequency of every 6 months. 
7. The final testing program was based on a target availability of 99.9% due to the slow progression rate of the 
failures means that there would be enough time to take corrective action to avoid the occurrence of a functional 
failure.   
8. The key to the success of the RBM lies in the accuracy and adequacy of the data that it is populated with; 
therefore, it should be updated after every WIT performed.  
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7. Further work  
While this thesis has demonstrated the application of reliability assessments to maintain safety and well integrity, 
there are many directions that can taken to extend the scope of this thesis.  
 Using non-parametric distributions, such as the Kaplan-Meier, when distributional assumptions cannot be 
justified.  
 Quantifying the system unavailability due to systematic failures as well as random failures for all the sub-
functions in the safety system (e.g. the initiators, logic solvers and final elements).  
 Performing a root-cause analysis for the five wells that needed WITs to be performed every three months.   
 Benchmarking RBM results (e.g. failure rate or PFD of the safety valves) with other companies to drive 
improvement in the well integrity management systems. 
Nomenclature  
SIL = Safety Integrity Level  
    Reliability Based model  
    Probability of failure on demand  
 = failure rate  
     Mean Time before Failure 
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9. Appendices  
A. Safety Function:   
The function(s) of an item or system must be identified prior to carrying out a reliability assessment. The function of 
the safety system studied is made up of a combination of sensors, logic solvers and final elements.  Its design intent 
is to isolate a topside well by first detecting a leakage or an unacceptable deviation; then deciding on the actions that 
must be taken and lastly implementing them (Fig. ) (Corneliussen & Sklet, 2003).  
 
Fig. A.1 Safety function - isolation of a topside well (Corneliussen & Sklet, 2003: p.3) 
In the event of a leak, safety will be assured by the closure of the ESD valve (s) and the complete shut-in of the well. 
Usually, one of the three isolation valves will be enough to achieve well isolation; however a SSSV will be activated 
if a fire is close to the wellhead zone. The RBD (Reliability Based Model) is used to model how each item‟s 
reliability contributes to the state (e.g. failure or success) of the safety system. It is made up of a combination of sub-
functions as shown in Fig. A.2. (Norsk Olje & gas, 2004).  
 
 
Fig. A.2 Reliability block diagram for failure to isolate a well (Norsk Olje & gas, 2004: p.71 
 
Fig. A.2. presents the parallel structure of the three isolation valves as each valve has a separate solenoid. The 
activation of the solenoid by the ESD results in the removal of the hydraulic power to the three valves, closing them 
and safeguarding the offshore assets.  
B. ANOVA  
The following ANOVA method is carried out to determine the reasons behind the variability in performance of the 
three valves, determine the test statistic and the critical F value.  
The first steps include calculating the mean of each of the three subgroups (i.e. valve types). The total sum of 
squares, SST is determined by: 
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where:  
   Total number of data points 
     Degrees of freedom  
    Variance 
 
Rearranging gives:  
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Sum of squares due to random error, SSE is then found by:  
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 (B-3) 
Sum of squares of the means against the groups, SSC is calculated by:  
 
    (       
    (B-5) 
where: 
Managing Well integrity using Reliability Based Models 18  
 
 
 
  The number of subgroups (i.e. C=3 because of the three isolation valves) in the study  
 
To describe the systematic variation in the dataset, the mean sum of squares is found by:   
 
    
   
     
 (B-6) 
 
To describe the mean random error variation in the dataset, the mean sum of squares is determined by:  
 
    
   
     
 (B-7) 
Ftest ratio is the mean variation among columns divided by the mean random variation. As it is stochastic, the Ftest 
value will need to be compared against a critical F ratio. 
 
      
   
   
 (B-8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managing Well integrity using Reliability Based Models 19  
 
 
 
 
C. Performance Measures:  
Distribution Function:  
The distribution function, F (t) is defined as:  
 
 (     (     ∫  (     
 
 
             (C-1) 
Where   
  = time to failure of an item which is assumed to be continuously distributed  
 
Probability Density function (PDF):  
The PDF is defined as:  
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Or in terms of reliability, R(t):  
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Reliability:  
An item‟s reliability can be defined as the „probability the item survives the time interval (0, t) (Rausand & Hoyland, 
2004: p.18). The reliability function or the survivor function is given as:  
 (      (     (                 
 
(C-4) 
 
Mean Time before Failure (MTBF):  
Engen and Rausand (1982) defined MTBF as the mean proportion of time that the isolation valves can operate as 
blowout barriers, before their first failure. (Engen & Rausand, 1982) Essentially, it is the difference between the 
uptime (normal item operation) and downtime (instantaneous item failure). It also accounts for the time it took to 
repair the failed item (Fig).   
 
 
Fig. C.1.  Representation of Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) 
Therefore MTBF is defined as:  
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF):  
Since f(t) = -R‟(t) from equation C-3 then the MTTF is:  
By partial integration, the MTTF is defined as: 
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As the valves in question are maintained during the WIT by cycling and lubricating the seals, it can be shown that 
[  (  ] 
    so that:  
Failure Rate:  
Failure rate is the number of failures observed in the lifetime of a valve. The statistical analysis confirmed that the 
population of valves in question were operating in the „useful life period‟ of the wear-out failure curve (Fig. 2.5). It 
was found that the lifetime data of the valves was exponentially distributed (See  0). With this distributional 
assumption, the failure rate was determined by;  
  
Probability of failure on demand (PFD): 
A WIT reveals the state variable(X) of a valve so that, 
 
   {
                                                                         
                                                                                                
  
 
The PFD can be defined graphically as:  
 
Fig. C.2 The state variable X (t) of a periodically tested item at testing time τ (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004: p.427).  
Unavailability of an item as a function of testing frequency:  
It can be shown that the item‟s unavailability   ̅(   is equivalent to the PFD: 
 
 
The long run average of an item‟s unavailability is therefore equal to the long run average of the PFD: 
Where   τ = Testing time interval  
 
Recall Equation C-4 then PFD becomes:  
Given that the data is exponentially distributed, substitute the survivor function ( (           in equation C-12 to 
relate the PFD (item unavailability) to the testing frequency τ (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004).  
 
Item Availability:  
For a single item, the availability can be determined by:  
Overall System availability as a function of testing frequency: 
Fig. A.2 shows that the three safety valves are parallel with each other. Therefore, the overall system availability is: 
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Where        i = PWV, PMV or PSSV 
(C-12) 
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The most optimal testing frequency per well was determined by setting a control limit for the system availability in 
the range of 99.9% to 99.95%.  
D. Probability Distributions  
The three probability distributions that provided a good fit to the lifetime data of the valves were the Weibull, 
Exponential and the Gamma distributions.  
D.1. Weibull Distribution  
The Weibull distribution is the most versatile distribution as it can model varying failure rates of a population over 
its lifetime, thus cover all zones in the bathtub failure curve (Fig. D.1) (Dodson, 2006).  
 
 
Fig. D.1. The bathtub curve as a function of the weibull shape parameter 
The general form of the Weibull probability density function (PDF) is given by the three-parameter Weibull: 
(O'Connor & Kleyner, 2011) 
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 (D-1)  
Where:  
 = total exposure time (days) which is the sum of the lifetime of the component regardless of test result 
 = Shape parameter which represents the failure rate behaviour and denotes where the item lies on the bathtub curve  
 = Scale parameter (characteristic life) which is the life at which 63.2% of the population will have failed  
 = Location parameter gives an indication of how far away the distribution lies along the abscissa  
 
All the installed valves have been verified by the Commission and Start up (CSU) testing and so it can be safely 
assumed that the valves are not installed failed. This means that the Weibull will start from the origin (t=0) and 
hence, the location parameter will be equal to 0. This reduces equation D-1 to a 2-parameter distribution and the 
corresponding reliability function is;  
 (    
 (
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 (D-2) 
The median ranks method is used to determine the Weibull parameters. This graphical method entails plotting the 
linearized logarithmic Weibull CDF (Cumulative Distribution Function) against logarithmic time (See section D.5on 
estimation of the Weibull Parameters).  
D.2. Exponential Distribution  
The application of an exponential distribution is only valid when a constant and random failure rate (e.g. 
corresponds to the useful life period of the failure curve in Fig. ) can be assumed.  
The failure rate is defined as:  
  
 
 
 (D-3) 
Where:  
r = Number of failures within a population  
T = Total lifetime of population  
 
The PDF of the exponential distribution is:  
 (     (                    (D-4) 
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 (C-15) 
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Therefore, the probability of the desired system to perform its function in a specific time frame is found by 
integrating the PDF, giving the reliability function of the exponential distribution;  
 (    (     (D-5)  
 
D.3. Gamma Distribution  
The gamma distribution represents the sum of n exponentially distributed random variables. The PDF is:  
 (   
 
 (    
(      (                        (D-6) 
Where:  
   = Shape parameter  
   Scale parameter  
   Gamma function 
From the statistical analysis performed on these distributions, both the gamma and the Weibull distributions had 
shape parameters equal to 1 to the nearest significant figure.  This reduced the two distributions to an exponential 
distribution.  
D.4. Chi-Square (    Function  
A more accurate method for determining the failure rate uses the chi-square function which replaces the number 
of failures in Equation D-3 (Modarres, 1999). This chi-square function is given by:  
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Where: 
    t-distribution values for the specified confidence interval  
  = Confidence interval (CI= 1- acceptable risk of error) 
   
      
 
  
 
(D-8) 
Where:  
   Degrees of freedom which determines the shape of the    distribution (     ) 
D.5. Estimation of the Weibull Parameters 
The probability distribution identification showed that the lifetime data for all the valves was consistent with a 2-
parameter Weibull distribution and so the Weibull parameters can be used to describe the reliability characteristics 
of each valve type in question. The Weibull scale parameter (η) gives the characteristic life of an item whilst the 
shape parameter (β) indicates the failure rate regime on the bathtub curve (Fig. D.1).  
The estimation of the Weibull parameters is performed by using all the data available. This dataset includes both the 
failed items and the right-censored items. Right censored items refer to the valves that have not yet failed and so 
their time to first failure can be predicted as it is known that the item survived to a known time without failure. 
Given the size of the dataset, the median ranks method is used to estimate these parameters (Dodson, 2006).  
1. The failed and right-censored observations are arranged in the order of the jth failure:  
   
(       
   
 (D-9) 
Where:  
   = The increment for the jth failure point 
  = total number of data points both censored and uncensored 
  = The order of the previous failure 
  = The number of data points remaining in the set (includes the current data point) 
         
(D-10) 
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Where:  
  = The order of the j
th
 failure 
 
2. The median rank F(t) is then determined by:  
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3. Since the CDF of the Weibull is equal to the median rank estimate;  
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The Weibull CDF can be linearized and put in the form of y =mx + b as follows:  
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Then:  
(D-16) 
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Equation D-17 is then plotted and a straight line is fitted to the data points.  
(D-17) 
4. The Weibull shape parameters from the slope of the line of best fit and the scale parameter from the 
offset of the graph are then used to determine the reliability of each valve type using equation D-2.   
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10. Critical Literature Review  
. 
ID/ EDITION YEAR TITLE AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION 
Issue 1 2012 Well integrity guidelines OGUK 
Provides the guidelines for 
managing well integrity in each 
stage of the well life cycle. It is 
clear that OGUK are encouraging 
operators to use condition-based 
maintenance over time-based 
maintenance when managing well 
integrity.   
Rev. 4 2013 
Well Integrity in drilling and 
well operations  
NORSOK 
Describes the minimum well 
integrity requirements, double 
barrier philosophy, contingency 
plans and maintenance procedures 
necessary to achieve compliance 
with the standards. 
Rev. 4 2012 
An introduction to Well 
Integrity 
Norsk Olje & 
Gass Well 
Integrity Forum 
(WIF) 
Outlines the correct procedure for 
carrying out FMECA and then 
presents a detailed FMECA study 
for safety-critical well barrier 
elements.   
Rev. 2 2004 
Application of IEC61508 and 
IEC 61511 in the Norwegian 
Petroleum Industry 
The Norwegian 
Oil Industry 
Association 
Defines the safety system 
responsible for the isolation of a 
topside well through schematics 
and reliability block diagrams.  
Outlines the different contributions 
to probability of failure on demand.  
BS EN 
60300-3-11 
2009 
Dependability Management – 
Part 3 -11: Application guide 
– Reliability centred 
maintenance  
 
British 
Standards 
Institution  
(BSI) 
Defines the RCM decision diagram 
which showed that condition-based 
maintenance is the most suitable 
when operating in the „useful life 
period‟ of the failure curve.  
Explains how to perform a detailed 
FMECA study.  
2
nd
 Ed. 2006 
Functional Safety 
electrical/electronic/programm
able electronic safety-related 
systems 
International 
Electrotechnical 
Commission 
(IEC) 
Defines SIL ranges for safety-
critical isolation valves and relates 
the SIL rating to a probability of 
failure on demand.  
Encourages on performing 
reliability assessments using 
specific reliability data to learn 
more about the safety system and to 
predict/plan better for the future.  
API 
RP14B/14H 
1994 Design, Installation, Repair 
and 
Operation of Subsurface 
Safety 
Valve Systems. 
American 
Petroleum 
Institute. 
Outlines how to work out leak rates 
from pressure testing.  
Specifies the acceptable leak rate 
limits and time to closure for the 
safety-critical valves in question. 
PhD thesis 2006 
Well Safety – Risk Control in 
the Operational Phase of 
Offshore Wells 
Kjell 
Corneliussen 
Provides good explanation of 
carrying out risk assessments in the 
operational phase of the well.  
Outlines a method for determining 
PFD of safety-critical well barrier 
elements.   
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Reliability 
Engineering 
& System 
Safety 
Journal, 61-1 
1998 
Reliability modelling of 
surface controlled subsurface 
safety valves 
Marvin Rausand 
and Jørn Vatn 
 
Defines all possible failure modes 
in safety valves under 
consideration.  
Presents both the Exponential and 
Weibull models for determining the 
availability and relating the values 
to a corresponding testing 
frequency.  
NACE-
02418, 7-11 
2002 
Factors Affecting the Shape 
Factor in the Weibull 
Distribution with Respect to 
Predicting Earliest Failures by 
SCC 
Roger W. 
Staehle and Zhi 
Fang 
Outlines a metholdogy for 
predicting the first time to failures 
using the Weibull distribution and 
the median ranks method to 
estimate the Weibull shape and 
scale parameters.  
MicroNote 
1003 
2012 
Calculating Chi-squared for 
Reliability Equations 
Paul Ellerman 
Describes a more accurate method 
for calculating the failure rates and 
MTTF values when an exponential 
distribution is assumed. This 
estimation is computed for a 
specific confidence level and 
degrees of freedom.  
Lifetime 
Reliability –
Solutions 
 
2014 
Do a Timeline Distribution 
before doing a 
Weibull Failure 
Analysis 
Lifetime 
Reliability 
Emphasizes the need for justifying 
the choice of a statistical 
distribution by relating argument to 
the Nowlan and Heap Failure 
curves.  
First Edition 1997 
Reliability-centred 
Maintenance 
John Moubray 
Explains the 6 dominant failure 
curves that can explain the failure 
behaviour of any item/system.  
Explains the 7 questions which 
must be answered in any RCM 
programme.  
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OGUK, Issue 1 (July 2012) 
 
Title:  
Well integrity guidelines 
 
Author:  
The UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Association Limited 
 
Contributions to the understanding of well integrity management:  
1. It defines the definition of a well barrier (p.22) and the functions of a DHSV (p. 86) and a Xmas tree (p.87).  
2. It recommends the necessary response in the event of an active barrier failure (p.27).  
3. It specifies the new well integrity guidelines for testing the three isolation valves which should be tested “at 
least every 6 months unless local conditions or documented historical data indicate a different testing 
frequency” (p.104),  It also recommends that “reliability findings specific to the asset and type of valve or 
location” should be used to validate the testing frequency (p.100).  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report aims to provide the procedures and guidelines necessary to achieve well integrity for the different stages 
of the well life cycle which include:  
- Defining the key regulatory requirements necessary for achieving well integrity  
- Identifying the need of both active and potential barriers for well control 
- Recommending the procedures required to operate and maintain wells and associated equipment in 
order to extend field life.  
   
Conclusions reached:  
The OGUK ha encouraged the implementation of condition-based maintenance as it has recommended validating 
the current policy using reliability findings.  
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NORSOK D-010, Rev. 4 (June 2013) 
 
Title:  
Well integrity in drilling and well operations  
 
Author:  
NORSOK  
 
Contributions to the understanding of well integrity management:  
1. It defines the industry accepted definition of well integrity, „the application of technical, operational, and 
organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of 
the well.‟ (NORSOK, 2013; p.4) 
2. It defines the relevant well barrier related terminology and links these terms with international standard 
definitions.  
3. It elaborates on the double barrier philosophy by defining many well barrier elements (50 different WBEs) and 
presenting well barrier schematics.   
4. It introduces the procedures, redundancy plans during drilling and operations. These procedures have accounted 
for the risk acceptance criteria.   
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report aims to provide the procedures and guidelines necessary to achieve well integrity for the different stages 
of the well life cycle. These NORSOK standards aim to achieve compliance to changes in legislation and adapt to 
new technology.  
   
Conclusions reached:  
NORSOK guidelines are much more prescriptive compared to the OGUK guidelines. However, both standards agree 
on the double barrier philosophy and that redundant systems must be put in place for safety-critical barriers.  
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Norsk Olje & Gass Well Integrity Forum (WIF), Rev. 4 (December, 2012) 
 
Title:  
An Introduction to Well Integrity 
 
Author:  
 Norsk Olje & Gass 
 
Contributions to the understanding of well integrity:  
1. It describes in detail what well integrity management entails and how likely is the loss of well integrity.  
2. It explains the NORSOK standards on well barrier, well barrier functions, well barrier elements and causes and 
consequences of well barrier failure.  
3. It presents a detailed failure analysis on the well barrier elements, FMECA and a fault tree analysis on safety-
critical systems.  
4. It outlines the procedure for performing a quantitative analysis to determine availability of safety-critical items.  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The document aims to provide a good general overview of well integrity to students in the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (NTNU) and University of Stavanger.   
   
Conclusions reached:  
The procedure for performing a correct FMECA was adopted in this thesis to evaluate the safety-critical isolation 
valves and determine the consequences and the associated severity as well as the mitigation measures that need to be 
taken to avoid such  failures.  
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OLF-070, Rev. 2 (October, 2004) 
 
Title:  
Application of IEC61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry 
 
Author:  
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association  
 
Contributions to the understanding of well integrity management:  
1. It defines the functions of the safety system responsible for isolation of a topside well (p. 45).  
 
Schematic showing the sub-functions of the safety system responsible for the complete shut-in of the well; it shows that the 
three valves are in parallel as they each have their own hydraulic supply, making their performance independent of the other.  
 
2. It specifies the minimum local SIL requirements in Norway for the SIS responsible for the isolation (p. 24).   
3. It outlines the main measures for the loss of safety and what measures contribute to the probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) (p.117).   
 
Schematic showing the contributions to the main measures for loss of safety are NSU (Non-Critical Safety Unavailability), 
PFDK (represents the known (k) part of the safety unavailability), PFDUK (represents the unknown part of the safety 
unavailability), PSF (Probability of Systematic Failure).  
 
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report aims to provide a set of guidelines which are based on the implementation of the IEC61508 and 
IEC61511 standards issued in 2003. Examples of functional safety assessments  
   
Conclusions reached:  
The guidelines for Norway specify a minimum SIL requirement for the isolation of topside well. However, in the 
UK, the guidelines issued are less prescriptive and so the SIL requirements are determined for each case using the 
acceptance criteria.  
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BS EN 60300-3-11 (November, 2009) 
 
Title: Dependability Management – Part 3 -11: Application guide – Reliability centred maintenance  
 
Author: British Standards Institution  (BSI) 
 
Contributions to the understanding of Reliability centred maintenance:  
1. It provides a very clear RCM decision diagram which was used to determine the feasibility of the testing 
programme from the RBM (p.25). 
2. It defines the P-F interval and specifies that the preventive maintenance frequency should be twice the P-F 
interval so that a potential failure is detected before the functional failure occurs (p.28). 
3. It highlights the benefits of carrying out condition monitoring tasks to extend life of the item and provides the 
criteria for a condition monitoring task to be applicable (p.29).  
4. It explains how to carry out a correct Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (p.39).  
5. It outlines the 6 dominant failure patterns and specifies the most appropriate failure management policy which 
should be used for each curve (p.42).  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
This report focuses on the development of failure management policies for equipment and the implementation of 
IEC60300 guidelines. It identifies the tasks which make up an effective preventive maintenance strategy (i.e. 
condition monitoring, scheduled restoration, scheduled replacement and failure finding).  
   
Conclusions reached:  
The population of valves in this study were shown to follow the wear-out failure curve. This document confirmed 
that condition monitoring is the most appropriate maintenance task to be carried out on the valves.  The guideline of 
ensuring the testing interval was at least twice the P-F interval was inappropriate as on average a P-F interval of 50 
months would mean a testing interval of every 25 months. With this, the minimum SIL requirement would not have 
been achieved; therefore, a smaller testing interval was sought.  
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Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 61-1 (August 1998) p.159-166  
 
Title: Reliability modelling of surface controlled subsurface safety valves  
 
Author: Marvin Rausand and Jørn Vatn  
 
Contributions to the understanding of Reliability statistics:  
1. It defines the possible failure modes for the sub-functions in this study and also outlines what causes them. This 
was useful in the FMECA carried out. (p.159)  
2. It justifies the assumption of constant failure rates and summarises the main outcomes of the Sintef report 
(p.160).  
3. It presents both the Exponential and Weibull models that can be used depending on the failure rate regime 
(p.161).  
4. It provides a rough approximation for MTTF using the maximum likelihood estimate (p.162).  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report provides a methodology for the implementation of a Weibull or exponential model. It then discusses the 
availability of the TRSVs in relation to the risk acceptance criteria and the ALARP principle.  
 
Methodology used:  
With respect to critical failures (i.e. FTC and LCP), the PFD under the exponential assumption is given as:  
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The PFD in the Weibull Model is as follows:  
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   Scale parameter  
   Shape parameter  
   Time since the start of the interval   
   Testing interval (months)  
 
The PFD determined from each model is the probability of failure on demand or the „conditional mean fractional 
dead time‟ the valve is expected to have in the next test interval.  
 
Conclusions reached:  
Whilst Sintef study showed that failure to close was the most common failure mode for the TRSVs, this study 
showed that a leaking valve in a closed position was the most common. The two outcomes of the study differ due to 
the various environmental and internal well conditions which impact the life span and performance of the valves 
studied.  
The shape parameter for each valve type was determined to be near 1. This therefore, reduced the Weibull model 
into the exponential model.  
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NACE-02418, Corrosion 2002, 7-11 (April 2002)  
 
Title: Factors Affecting the Shape Factor in the Weibull Distribution with Respect to Predicting Earliest Failures by 
SCC 
 
Author: Roger W. Staehle and Zhi Fang   
 
Contributions to the understanding of Reliability statistics:  
1. It describes the approach for predicting first time failures caused by corrosion using the Weibull distribution 
(p.3-5).  
2. It analyses sensitivity studies carried out to determine how environmental conditions can impact on the weibull 
shape parameter in particular.   
3. It justifies the use of the same shape parameter values if environmental conditions are similar (p.37).  
 
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report provides a methodology for predicting time to first failure due to corrosion. It gives a detailed overview 
of the different factors which can impact the Weibull shape parameter and hence the time to first failure.  
 
Methodology used:  
It recommends the estimation of the Weibull parameters should be carried out using the linearized Weibull 
cumulative distribution function.   
  [  (
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Where: 
    Location parameter or initiation time  
 
Conclusions reached:  
- The time to the first failure is estimated by finding the scale parameter which is equivalent to the 
characteristic life of the item. 
- The shape parameter is based on physical processes and so emphasises the need for an efficient preventive 
maintenance (and especially condition monitoring) strategy.  
- The shape parameter, beta, significantly affects the early failure ratio and it describes the dispersion of data 
- The scale parameter, eta, relates to the central value of the data 
- The location parameter a particular offset which is associated with time 
- Low MTTF values (<1 year) are expected in fields with a high CO2 content, high flow rates, high solid 
deposition or wax, scale and hydrates.  
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IEC61508, Second edition, (January 2006)  
 
Title: Functional Safety electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems 
 
Author: International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
 
Contributions to the understanding of Reliability centred maintenance:  
1. It defines the SIL ranges for the isolation valves (low demand mode of operation) and then relates them to 
the probability of failure on demand: 
 
2. It states a quantitative reliability requirement to safety functions by using specific field reliability data. 
These guidelines are implemented in Norway.  
3. It outlines the difference in random hardware and systematic failures and it also differs between detected 
and undetected failures.  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
It provides a detailed overview of the key concepts associated with achieving functional safety at all times such as 
the dependability of n components in a safety system and the influence of modes of operation on the SIL.  
   
Conclusions reached:  
The SIL choice directly impacts the testing frequency results and so the method prescribed by the IEC standards was 
followed in order to determine the most appropriate SIL requirement. The ANOVA method was carried out to 
determine the whether the failures observed were random or systematic as this differentiation was stressed in these 
IEC standards.  
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PhD Thesis, 2006 
 
Title: Well Safety – Risk Control in the Operational Phase of Offshore Wells 
 
Author: Kjell Corneliussen 
 
Contributions to the understanding of Well integrity management:  
1. It outlines the framework for achieving well integrity management and bases that framework on the 
IEC61508/61511 standards and the NORSOK D-010 standards.  
2. It explains the procedure of carrying out well risk assessments in the operational phase of the well life cycle.   
3. It provides a detailed overview on assessing causes of failure, the consequences of failure and the criteria for 
determining if a deviation is acceptable or not.  
4. It provides a method for calculating the probability of failure on demand for the DHSVs . 
5. It discusses the effects of testing in industry and outlines the causes and strategies for avoiding these failures. 
 
Objectives of the Report:  
This report aims to develop a systematic approach for risk assessment and managing well integrity in the operational 
phase of the well life cycle.  
 
Methodology used:  
All the requirements set by the NORSOK D-010 standards (i.e. identifying a barrier failure, type of failure etc.) must 
be included in the risk assessment. This risk assessment must be performed before a well barrier failure.  
The reliability block diagram for the well shut-in function was also used in this study.  
The appendices of this PhD contains a detailed overview of the methodology used by Corneliussen to relate the the 
risk acceptance criteria to the safety integrity level; which was then used to determine the safety system‟s 
unavailability.  
 
Conclusions reached:  
The strategies for avoiding failures were accounted for in this report. The restoration and repair of the valves as well 
as the framework for deviations was also considered following Corneliussen‟s recommendations.  
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Second Edition, 2004  
 
Title: System Reliability Theory: Models, statistical Methods and Applications  
 
Author: Marvin Rausand and Arnljot Høyland 
 
Contributions to the understanding of Reliability statistics:  
1. It gives a detailed overview of RAM (Reliability, Availability and Maintainability) and the approach needed to 
maintain reliability of safety systems.  
2. It presents both parametric and non-parametric method for life data analysis.  
3. It describes the methodology of determining the performance measures in section  C which was based on the 
IEC61508 standards.  
 
Objectives of the book:  
The book explains in depth the system reliability theory for a variety of applications. The reliability and 
maintenance modelling techniques which are compliant with the IEC61508 standards are discussed and relevant 
examples/case-studies are discussed.   
 
Methodology used:  
The statistical technique adopted in this thesis followed the procedures outlined in chapters 4 (systems of 
independent components), 9 (reliability of maintained systems), 10 (reliability of safety systems) and 11 (life data 
analysis).  
 
Conclusions reached:  
Although both parametric as well as non-parametric methods were considered; Rausand suggests using a parametric 
distribution if distributional assumptions can be justified. As the distribution assumptions were verified by carrying 
out an ANOVA method and a variety of statistical fittings, three parametric distributions were considered which 
were: the Weibull distribution, the gamma distribution and the exponential distribution.  
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MicroNote 1003, (September, 2012)  
 
Title: Calculating Chi-squared for Reliability Equations 
 
Author: Paul Ellerman 
 
Contributions to the understanding of Reliability statistics:  
1. It outlines a more accurate method for calculating failure rates and MTTF values when an exponential 
distribution is assumed.  
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2. It also recommends that the chi-square estimations is calculated from the lower limits of the distribution (i.e. 
area to the left)  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report outlines a method for calculating more accurate failure rate and MTTF values for reliability applications.  
 
Methodology used:  
The statistical technique presented in this document was adopted by Microsemic (MSCC) facilities.  
 
Conclusions reached:  
The chi-squared estimation formula presented in this document was used for the reliability calculations in the thesis 
as each estimated value was computed for a particular confidence level (CL) and degrees of freedom value that was 
specific to the data inputted.   
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Lifetime Reliability –Solutions, 2014 
 
Title: Do a Timeline Distribution before doing a Weibull Failure Analysis  
 
Author: Lifetime Reliability  
 
Contributions to the understanding of statistical distribution choice:  
1. Outlines the drawbacks of using the Weibull analysis as it requires a large data size for the accurate estimation 
of the parameters and it assumes that the future will be the same as the past.  
2. Emphasises the importance of carrying out a timeline distribution to understand the failure behaviour over time 
and select an appropriate distribution analysis.  
 
Objectives of the Report:  
The report aims to identify the importance of selecting an appropriate statistical distribution which can mimic the 
failure behaviour of the items under consideration.  
 
Methodology used:  
The author bases his argument on the Nowlan and Heap curves which show the 6 dominant failure curve patterns of 
an item or system.  
 
 
Conclusions reached:  
The use of the correct statistical distribution must be justified by carrying out statistical fittings and determining the 
most suitable distribution which mimics the failure behaviour of the three safety valves.  
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First edition, 1997  
 
Title: Reliability-centred Maintenance 
 
Author: John Moubray  
 
Contributions to the understanding of RCM:   
1. Presents and answers the 7 questions which must be answered by any effective RCM programme.  
1. What are the functions of the asset? 
2. In what way can the asset fail to fulfill its required function(s)? 
3. What causes each functional failure? 
4. What are the failure effects of that failure? 
5. What are the failure consequences?  
6. What should be done to prevent or predict the failure? 
7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found? 
2. Presents the 6 dominant failure curves where half are age-related and the other half are independent of time.  
3. Emphaises the importance of an effective maintenance strategy  
 
Objectives of the book:  
The book provides a detailed overview of reliability centred maintenance and discusses each of the 7 
aforementioned questions in great detail.   
 
Conclusions reached:  
The wear-out failure curve was used to present the failure behaviour of the valves in question as they are age-related 
and have had burn-in procedures performed which removed all the defective parts before the complete assembly of 
the safety system.  The 7 question of RCM were answered throughout the work.  
 
